Senegal’s New Deal Technologique: Assessing Year One, or Questioning Our Ability to Govern Digital Transformation?

An assessment that goes beyond a progress report

Launched in February 2025, Senegal’s New Deal Technologique sets out an ambitious vision for the country’s digital transformation. Its objectives extend beyond the modernization of public administration. They include strengthening digital sovereignty, accelerating the digitization of public services, developing the digital economy, and positioning Senegal as a leading digital player in Africa.

The assessment of its first year is therefore an important milestone.

The Terms of Reference for this exercise outline a broad mandate: review ongoing initiatives, assess progress against objectives, identify implementation challenges, examine financing, engage public and private stakeholders, and propose an action plan for the remainder of 2026 and 2027.

This is clearly necessary. A transformation of this scale requires regular assessment, transparency, and the ability to adjust priorities.

However, the proposed approach also raises several questions about the way Senegal intends to govern and manage its digital transformation.

The issue is not whether an external assessment is appropriate. Independent expertise can bring methodological rigor, objectivity, and a valuable outside perspective. The deeper question is whether the country is building a permanent institutional capability to monitor, coordinate, and steer the transformation beyond this initial assessment.

Three aspects deserve particular attention.

1. The risk of a mismatch between assessment and execution cycles

The first question concerns timing.

The assessment is intended to establish the status of initiatives launched during the first year and identify the adjustments required for the next phase. Yet digital transformation is not a static exercise. Projects continue to evolve, budgets are committed, priorities change, and new dependencies emerge while an assessment is being conducted.

This creates a potential risk of misalignment between the assessment cycle and the implementation cycle.

If the information used to establish the baseline is already outdated by the time recommendations are delivered, decision-makers may be working with a picture that no longer fully reflects reality.

This is not necessarily a criticism of the proposed timetable. The Terms of Reference provide for an eight-week assignment, starting from the notification of the service order or contract signature. The actual start date and delivery date will depend on the procurement and contracting process.

The broader issue is the need for continuous visibility.

A national transformation program should not have to reconstruct its status every time an assessment is commissioned. It should maintain a regularly updated view of initiatives, performance indicators, financial commitments, risks, dependencies, and implementation challenges.

An annual assessment should consolidate and challenge this information, not become the primary mechanism through which it is collected.

2. Eight weeks to assess a transformation of national scale

The second question concerns the scope and complexity of the assignment.

The New Deal Technologique covers four major strategic areas:

• Digital sovereignty: infrastructure, cybersecurity, data governance, and regulation.
• Digitization of public services: e-government and digital public infrastructure.
• Digital economy: startups, fintech, employment, and e-commerce.
• African digital leadership: digital diplomacy, international cooperation, and initiatives such as the AI Hub.

Each area involves different institutions, stakeholders, technical capabilities, financing mechanisms, and implementation timelines.

Assessing progress across all four areas requires more than collecting project updates. It involves reconciling information from multiple sources, validating indicators, examining financial commitments and disbursements, identifying dependencies, and understanding the institutional and operational constraints affecting delivery.

The Terms of Reference provide for a two-month mission, including documentation review, stakeholder consultations, analysis, preparation of a provisional report, and final validation.

An eight-week timeframe does not automatically imply a superficial assessment. Its quality will depend on the availability and reliability of existing data, the maturity of monitoring mechanisms, the accessibility of stakeholders, and the methodology adopted by the selected firm.

Nevertheless, the timeframe highlights an important prerequisite: the quality of an assessment depends heavily on the quality of the information and governance mechanisms already in place.

Without a shared reference framework, standardized indicators, clear ownership, and reliable reporting, a significant portion of the assignment may be spent reconstructing information rather than analyzing performance and identifying strategic adjustments.

The challenge, therefore, is not simply to conduct a good assessment. It is to build the conditions that make future assessments more efficient, more reliable, and more useful for decision-making.

3. The role of the Delivery Unit: oversight or permanent steering capability?

The third question is perhaps the most strategic.

The Terms of Reference identify the Delivery Unit of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Digital Technology as the body responsible for supervising the assignment. They also provide for a weekly monitoring committee chaired by the Delivery Unit.

This is an important institutional responsibility.

The use of an external consulting firm is legitimate and can be valuable. An independent firm can provide specialized expertise, challenge assumptions, facilitate stakeholder consultations, and offer an objective assessment of progress.

However, independent evaluation and permanent program steering are two different capabilities.

An external firm can assess the state of implementation at a given point in time. It cannot replace the institutional mechanisms required to monitor initiatives continuously, coordinate stakeholders, arbitrate priorities, resolve dependencies, and ensure that decisions are translated into action.

The Delivery Unit should therefore be equipped with the tools, information, authority, and institutional support required to perform this ongoing role.

This is not an argument against external expertise. It is an argument for strengthening internal capacity.

A country cannot sustainably delegate the governance of its own digital transformation. External partners can support, advise, and challenge, but the ability to steer the transformation must remain an institutional capability.

Beyond project management: building a national governance architecture

These questions point to a broader issue: the New Deal Technologique should not be managed solely as a portfolio of technology projects.

It is a national transformation involving multiple interconnected dimensions: infrastructure, data, digital identity, interoperability, public services, regulation, private-sector development, skills, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence.

Progress in one area can depend directly on decisions made in another.

For example, digitizing a public service is not simply a matter of developing an application. It may require interoperable data systems, reliable digital identity mechanisms, redesigned administrative processes, appropriate legal frameworks, secure infrastructure, and the capacity of public servants and citizens to use the service.

Similarly, developing a national AI ecosystem requires more than launching isolated AI initiatives. It depends on access to data, computing infrastructure, skills, research capabilities, regulatory clarity, and an environment in which businesses and institutions can adopt these technologies.

This is where a national digital governance and enterprise architecture becomes essential.

Such an architecture would provide a coherent view of the transformation by connecting:

• Strategic objectives and expected outcomes.
• Institutional responsibilities and decision-making authority.
• Business and public-service capabilities to be developed.
• Programs, projects, and initiatives contributing to those capabilities.
• Technical standards, shared platforms, and interoperability requirements.
• Dependencies, risks, resources, and financing.
• Performance indicators and evidence of achieved results.

In practical terms, it would make it possible to understand not only which projects are progressing, but also how they contribute to the country's strategic objectives and how they depend on one another.

Project portfolio management (PPM) is an important component of this approach, but it is not sufficient on its own. A portfolio dashboard can show project status; a governance architecture helps explain whether the projects collectively form a coherent transformation.

Four foundations for stronger governance

To move in this direction, four complementary foundations deserve attention.

1. A shared portfolio and performance management framework

All initiatives contributing to the New Deal should be registered and monitored through a common framework.

Each initiative should have, at a minimum:

• A unique identifier and an accountable owner.
• A clear link to a strategic objective.
• A defined scope, baseline, and expected outcomes.
• Physical and financial progress indicators.
• Key milestones, risks, dependencies, and blockers.
• Supporting evidence for reported progress.

The framework should also distinguish between activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts.

For example, launching an online platform is an output. The number of citizens successfully using it is an adoption indicator. Reduced processing time or fewer administrative visits are outcomes. The broader improvement in service accessibility and quality is an impact.

These distinctions are essential to avoid confusing project delivery with actual transformation.

A PPM platform may eventually support this framework, but the first step should be to define the data model, indicators, reporting rules, and responsibilities. Technology should support an agreed governance model, not substitute for one.

2. Clear decision-making and arbitration mechanisms

Monitoring progress is not enough if identified problems cannot be resolved.

A national transformation program needs clear mechanisms for escalating issues and making decisions across institutional boundaries.

Who arbitrates when two initiatives depend on the same infrastructure? Who resolves conflicting priorities between ministries? Who can reallocate resources when a strategic initiative is blocked? Who is accountable when a dependency delays several projects?

These questions require more than a responsibility matrix. They require explicit decision rights, escalation paths, and governance forums with the authority to act.

A practical rhythm could include monthly portfolio reviews focused on delivery, risks, and blockers, complemented by quarterly strategic reviews focused on outcomes, priorities, resource allocation, and necessary adjustments.

The objective is to make governance a mechanism for action rather than simply a reporting exercise.

3. Financial traceability connected to results

The financial dimension deserves particular attention.

A credible assessment should distinguish between funding that has been announced, negotiated, committed, contracted, disbursed, and actually spent.

These categories represent different levels of financial maturity and should not be treated as interchangeable.

More importantly, financial reporting should be connected to implementation progress and expected results.

How much has been invested in a given strategic objective? What capabilities have been delivered? What outcomes have been achieved? Where are the remaining financing gaps? Which initiatives face funding constraints, and what are the consequences for the overall roadmap?

This connection between financial resources and measurable results is essential for prioritization, accountability, and informed decision-making.

4. Permanent public-private dialogue

The digital transformation of a country cannot be designed and implemented by government institutions alone.

Private companies, startups, technology providers, universities, research institutions, civil society, and end users all have a role to play.

The Terms of Reference recognize the importance of stakeholder consultations and identify opportunities for public-private partnerships. This is a positive starting point.

However, consultation should not be limited to a one-off exercise conducted during an assessment.

A permanent mechanism for public-private dialogue could help identify emerging needs, assess market capabilities, surface implementation barriers, and translate relevant proposals into concrete opportunities.

For this to work, the process should be transparent. Proposals should be assessed against clear criteria, aligned with national priorities, and subject to appropriate governance and procurement mechanisms.

The objective is not simply to collect opinions. It is to create a structured channel through which the country's digital ecosystem can contribute to the design and delivery of the transformation.

Measuring implementation is not the same as measuring impact

One final distinction is particularly important.

An assessment of implementation progress does not necessarily establish the actual impact of a transformation program.

A platform may be delivered on schedule but remain underused. A public service may be digitized without simplifying the citizen's experience. A new infrastructure investment may increase technical capacity without improving the accessibility, reliability, or affordability of services.

This is why the New Deal should be assessed not only through the number of projects launched, platforms delivered, or budgets mobilized, but also through the changes experienced by citizens, businesses, and public institutions.

Are administrative procedures becoming simpler? Are citizens spending less time accessing public services? Are businesses finding it easier to operate and innovate? Are public institutions making better use of data? Is the digital economy creating sustainable opportunities and jobs?

These are the kinds of questions that connect technology investments to the transformation's ultimate purpose.

The distinction matters because a successful digital transformation is not measured by the quantity of technology deployed, but by the value it creates.

Conclusion: digital sovereignty also means mastering the ability to govern

The assessment of Year One of the New Deal Technologique is an important opportunity for Senegal.

It should help establish what has been achieved, identify what is falling behind, clarify financing requirements, and inform the next phase of implementation.

But the opportunity is broader than producing a report.

It is an opportunity to strengthen the country's permanent capacity to design, coordinate, monitor, and adapt its digital transformation.

Digital sovereignty is not only about controlling infrastructure, data, and technology. It also means mastering the institutional capacity to define priorities, make informed decisions, coordinate stakeholders, measure results, and continuously adjust the course of transformation.

External expertise can accelerate this process, but it cannot replace that capacity.

Ultimately, the question is not simply whether Senegal can assess the first year of its New Deal Technologique.

It is whether, by the end of this assessment, Senegal will have built the governance mechanisms needed to know where it stands and steer its transformation without having to reconstruct its monitoring and evaluation system every year.

If Senegal had to assess Year Two, Year Three, or Year Five of the New Deal Technologique, would it already have the data, indicators, responsibilities, and decision-making mechanisms needed to establish its actual level of progress?

That is perhaps one of the most important measures of the country's digital maturity.